



Towards a better understanding of adolescent risk taking: Contextual moderators and 
model-based analysis 
 









1Leiden University, Department of Psychology; Brain & Development lab, Wassenaarseweg 
52, 2333 AK Leiden, The Netherlands 
2Leiden Institute for Brain and Cognition, 2333 AK Leiden, The Netherlands 
3Radboud University, Behavioural Science Institute and Donders Institute for Brain, 






Towards a better understanding of adolescent risk taking: Contextual moderators and 
model-based analysis 
Adolescence is the transition period between childhood and adulthood during which 
individuals gain independence and develop mature social goals. The age range of adolescence 
differs between countries and cultures, but it is generally agreed upon that, in Western 
societies, adolescence encompasses the period of approximately ages 10 to 22 years 
(Blakemore, & Robbins, 2012; Crone, & Dahl, 2012). The onset of adolescence commences 
at the start of puberty, which is the phase in life during which rapid increases in gonadal 
hormones result in changes in physical appearance, such as voice changes in boys and breast 
development in girls, but also behavioral and brain changes (Blakemore, Burnett, & Dahl, 
2010). That is, it has been found previously that pubertal hormones have a massive influence 
on the developing brain structure and function (Peper, & Dahl, 2013). Puberty thus marks the 
first phase of adolescence and starts approximately around ages 10-11-years, on average 1.5 
years earlier for girls than for boys, and lasts until approximately age 15-16 years (Blakemore 
et al., 2010). The second phase of adolescence (16-22 years) is characterized by the 
development of mature goals and gaining independence from parents. The end of adolescence 
is mostly culturally defined, and is dependent on when individuals obtain a mature role in 
society (Crone, & Dahl, 2012). 
Adolescence often has been described as a period of increased risk taking (Reyna, & 
Farley, 2006). Risk taking is typically referred to behaviors or decisions in which outcomes 
are uncertain, and in which at least one negative consequence could occur. A more formal 
description has been used in economics and the decision sciences, in which risk taking is 
defined as choosing the option with the largest outcome variability (Figner, & Weber, 2011). 
Adolescent risky behavior is consistent with both conceptualizations of risk taking, as often 
these behaviors can result in potentially large rewards for adolescents (such as obtaining high 
status with peers when stealing an exam), but also in large costs (such as being suspended 
because for being caught when stealing the exam). Epidemiological reports have observed an 
increase in risk taking behavior in adolescence, such as for traffic accidents, delinquency, and 
substance abuse (see Willoughby, Good, Adachi, Hamza, & Tavernier, 2013). Therefore, it is 
often assumed that adolescents take more risks than children and adults, which may come at a 
substantial individual and societal costs. Since there is evidence that this is a universal 
characteristic of all known human societies—and also shared with other mammal species—
there is reason to believe that this may have evolutionary adaptive value. For example, 
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because risk taking is necessary for exploring new environments, achieving high social ranks, 
or experimenting with new social roles in society (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Wilson & Daly, 
1985). However, others have argued that adolescents merely have more opportunity for risk 
taking, because they are less supervised compared to young children (e.g., Willoughby et al., 
2013).  
Several studies used a controlled experimental environment (with equal opportunity 
for risk taking in all age groups) to test the question whether there is a unique adolescent 
signature of risk taking. Such laboratory studies have remained elusive with respect to 
whether risk taking is reliably observed in adolescence, and under which circumstances. Some 
studies have shown that children, adolescents and adults take similar levels of risk (van 
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015; van Leijenhorst, Westenberg, & Crone, 2008). Others have 
observed that adolescents take more risks than adults but less than young children, suggesting 
a monotonic decrease across adolescence in risk taking (Crone, & van der Molen, 2004; van 
Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Bredman, & Huizenga, 2012). Finally, some studies have shown that 
adolescents take more risks than children and adults, especially in ‘hot’ contexts that trigger 
affective-emotional processes (Burnett, Bault, Coricelli, & Blakemore, 2010; Figner, 
Mackinley, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009a), such as when rewards are high (Braams, Peters, 
Peper, Guroglu, & Crone, 2014), or under socially arousing situations (Chein, Albert, 
O’Brien, Uckert, & Steinberg, 2011). A recent meta-analysis (Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & van 
Aken, 2015) examined the evidence for heightened levels of risk taking in adolescence 
(compared to childhood and adulthood) on laboratory tasks. This meta-analysis showed that 
risk taking decreased between adolescence and adulthood, but that children and adolescents 
showed similar levels of risk tasking, although contextual factors of the decision making 
situation could influence this pattern. A question for further research is therefore when, i.e., 
under which circumstances, adolescent risk taking is triggered and when it is not. That is, to 
what extent does adolescent risk taking depend on different contextual factors? In the 
following sections of this chapter we will focus particularly on the decision domain and the 
level of experienced decision-uncertainty as two specific contextual moderators. 
Another important question is what drives adolescent risk taking, i.e., what are the 
mechanisms underlying different levels of overt risk taking. One way to better understand 
potential mechanisms is to decompose the different components of risk taking with 
experimental designs suited for this purpose. In the decision sciences and behavioral 
economics, several model-based approaches exist that allow to decompose overt risk-taking 
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levels into underlying mechanisms. This approach, which so far has been mostly applied to 
adult risk-taking, may prove valuable for understanding risk taking in adolescence as well. 
That is, some adolescents may be more inclined to focus on the rewarding feeling of positive 
outcomes when taking risks (such as, in our earlier example, focusing on gaining peer status 
when stealing an exam), whereas others may focus more on the potential negative outcomes 
(such as being suspended). Therefore, we will also describe several prominent—and 
promising—decision models and highlight the potential of such decomposition approaches for 
studying adolescent risk taking. 
Taken together, there is a clear societal need to have a better understanding of risk 
taking in adolescence, and experimental studies have made tremendous progress in 
understanding the determinants of risk taking in the laboratory. This increase use of 
experimental approaches also has led to several important lingering questions particularly 
focusing on the questions (1) under which circumstances do adolescents take more risks than 
adults and children, and (2) what drives adolescent risk-taking. Research on these questions 
has benefited much from experimental behavioral studies, but also from physiological 
measures, such as brain activity when individuals take risks or when individuals obtain 
rewards (e.g., Crone, van Duijvenvoorde, & Peper, 2016). That is, across adolescence, and 
into early adulthood, several studies have shown that there are large functional and structural 
changes in the brain, such as ongoing increases in myelination and a gradual decrease in 
synaptic density (e.g., Gogtay et al., 2004; Huttenlocher, 1990; Tamnes et al., 2010). In this 
chapter we will therefore also take into account neural changes that help to pinpoint changes 
in adolescent risk-taking. 
The when of adolescent risk-taking 
Domain-specific risk taking 
It has been debated in the psychological literature whether risk taking is a unidimensional 
construct. That is, a dominant view states that risk taking represents either a single personality 
trait or a small cluster of traits (e.g., impulsivity and sensation seeking; Hansen & Breivik, 
2001). However, the relation between trait like impulsivity and real-world risk taking is 
relatively complex, and a single trait typically will not predict risk taking across different 
domains or situations very well (Fox & Tannenbaum, 2011; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002).  
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One way to unpack risk taking is to focus on the potential domain-specificity of 
individuals’ risk taking. Domain-specific risk taking means that somebody’s risk taking in one 
domain (e.g., recreational risk taking, such as bungee-jumping) may not be highly correlated 
with his or her risk taking in another domain (e.g., financial risk taking, such as investment 
behavior). The Domain Specific Risk Taking scale (DOSPERT; see Blais, & Weber, 2006; 
Weber et al., 2002) is an instrument that assesses individuals’ risk taking across five broad 
domains: Social (e.g., asking an employer for a raise), Recreational (e.g., skydiving), 
Financial (sometimes split into an investment and a gambling component; investment: e.g., 
investing in a speculative stock; gambling: e.g., betting money on a sporting event), 
Health/Safety (e.g., drinking too much alcohol at a party), and Ethical (e.g., cheating on a tax 
return). The adult DOSPERT scale has shown evidence of construct validity in a full (Weber 
et al., 2002) and a shortened version (Blais, & Weber, 2006), and DOSPERT self-reports have 
been related to real-life risk-taking behavior. For instance, Markiewicz and Weber (2013) 
found that individuals reporting more risk taking propensity specifically on the DOSPERT 
gambling component were also more likely to engage in excessive stock trading.  
Within the DOSPERT scale, risk taking—the self-reported likelihood of engaging in a 
risky activity—is measured separately from two additional scales that measure perceived risks 
and expected benefits of engaging in risky activities in each domain. Thus, an important 
advantage of the DOSPERT is that it assesses not just domain-specific risk taking propensities 
but also two important motivators of such behavior, namely perceived risks and benefits. This 
builds on a risk-return framework, in which risk taking is predicted by both perceived risks 
(alternatively described as ‘fear’) and perceived benefits (alternatively described as ‘greed’) 
(Weber et al., 2002). Thus, risk behavior will vary across domains if there are differences in 
the subjective perception of risks and/or expected benefits. Although most people will dislike 
risks and like benefits, important individual differences in risk- and benefit-perception exist, 
which may explain differences in overt risk taking.   
Emerging evidence indeed suggests that risk taking is a domain-specific construct. For 
instance, it has been found that smokers take more risks that concern their health compared to 
non-smokers, but do not take more risks in other domains such as financial or social risk 
taking (Hanoch, Johnson, & Wilke, 2006). Similarly, documented recreational risk takers 
(e.g., skydivers) have only average risk-averse scores in other domains (e.g., Hanoch et al., 
2006). Also, greater decision making competence―which reflects individual differences in 
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rational responding across several classic behavioral decision-making tasks―has been related 
to less risk taking, but only for domains which are more maladaptive in nature, such as health 
and gambling risks (Weller, Ceshi, & Randolph, 2015). Additionally, HEXACO personality 
factors have been shown to be related to common and distinct aspects of risk taking. That is, 
‘openness’ specifically related to risk taking in social and recreational domains, whereas 
lower ‘honesty/humility’ has been associated with greater health and ethical risk taking 
(Weller, & Tikir, 2011). Finally, Rolison and colleagues (Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Liu, 
2014) observed—besides a pattern of normative age-related decline in risk taking—that 
financial and recreational risk taking showed steeper declines into old age than social, ethical 
and health domains (see for a longitudinal approach Josef et al., 2016). Collectively, these 
findings suggest some level of domain-specificity in adults’ risk taking. A next question for 
research is whether different risk-taking domains exhibit different developmental trajectories.  
In adolescence research, there is no comparable research on domain-specificity in risk 
taking, but there is some evidence that this might be the case. For instance, different addictive 
behaviors (substance use, gambling, gaming) have been specifically related to characteristics 
such as depression and extraversion (for substance use) and to irritability/aggression, social 
anxiety, and low self-esteem (for gaming) (Walther, Morgenstern, & Hanewinkel, 2012). To 
test individual’s domain-specific risk-taking behavior further, an adolescent-version of the 
DOSPERT recently has been developed (although not yet evaluated in a large sample). The 
adolescent DOSPERT (originally developed by Bernd Figner and Elke Weber) includes 
similar decision domains as the adult DOSPERT and similarly builds on a risk-return 
framework, yet includes adolescent-appropriate domain-specific questions. A functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study has used a tentative version of the adolescent 
DOSPERT in adolescents (ages 13-17, n = 18) and adults (ages 25-30, n = 16) to test the 
relation between neural activation during risky choice and real-life reported risk taking 
(Barkley-Levenson, van Leijenhorst, & Galvan, 2013). To this end, this study used a choice 
paradigm with mixed gambles presenting a 50-50 probability of winning or losing a certain 
amount of money, and a choice to accept (i.e., play) or reject this gamble (see for a similar 
paradigm in adults studying loss-aversion: Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007. Results 
showed that greater activation in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) during risk-
avoidant choices was related to less self-reported risk taking, but only in adolescents. Because 
the medial PFC has been implicated in the representation of value during risky decision-
making (e.g., Levy et al., 2010), the authors interpreted this finding as a lower reliance of 
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value-assessments when evaluating choices for adolescents who were more inclined toward 
real-world risk taking. These results highlight the possible application of the adolescent 
DOSPERT to study individual differences and age-related change in adolescent risk-taking. 
However, it was not yet investigated to what extent brain-behavior relations of risk taking 
may be domain-specific across adolescence, nor to what extent risks and benefits influence 
risk-taking levels. Moreover, these findings will need to be supported by further (larger) 
studies. In ongoing studies, we are currently validating the adolescent DOSPERT scale in 
several large developmental samples. Moreover, we currently investigate the domain-
specificity and factors underlying (risk and benefit perception) in adolescent’s self-reported 
risk-taking.  
Decision making under uncertainty  
Another important construct that may drive individuals’ risk taking is the level of uncertainty 
encountered in the decision environment. That is, although the magnitudes of the outcomes of 
risky choices are usually known (e.g., the pleasure one derives from smoking a cigarette), the 
probabilities of those outcomes may often not be known exactly or be even completely 
unknown (for example whether one will develop lung cancer because of smoking). First, risk 
can occur under conditions in which the probabilities of the outcomes are completely known. 
This has been defined as explicit risk (Knight, 1921; Tversky & Kahneman, 1979), and 
examples include a coin toss (for which the chances are 50:50), or a roulette wheel (for which 
the chance of the wheel stopping at the color red, for instance, is also just below 50:50). 
However, real-life often does not present exact probabilities. Consider the example of driving 
through a red light. One may know that a traffic accident is possible, but unlike a coin toss, 
one cannot be certain of the probability that this outcome may occur. The level of uncertainty 
(sometimes referred to as ambiguity) has been found to have differential effects on risk taking 
across the life span (Tymula, Rosenberg Belmaker, Ruderman, Glimcher, & Levy, 2013) and 
adolescents seem to be particularly ambiguity-tolerant (Blankenstein, Crone, van den Bos, & 
van Duijvenvoorde, 2016; Tymula et al., 2012).   
Prior studies have shown that people generally have an aversion to both explicit risk 
(known probabilities; Von Gaudecker, Van Soest, & Wengström, 2011) and ambiguous risk 
(unknown/uncertain probabilities; Ellsberg, 1961), but people show an even stronger aversion 
to ambiguous than known risk. This can be illustrated by the famous Ellsberg paradox 
(Ellsberg, 1961), in which two urns are presented: one urn with 50 red and 50 black balls, and 
one urn with 100 red and black balls in an unknown distribution. People typically prefer the 
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first urn when asked to bet between urns for grabbing a red ball. Yet when asked to bet on a 
black ball from one of the urns, they again bet on the first urn with the known distribution of 
balls. This continuous betting on the urn with the known probabilities contradicts individuals’ 
earlier beliefs about the distribution of the second urn (i.e., that there are more black balls in 
the second urn), and illustrates people’s aversion to unknown distributions (i.e., ambiguity).  
Most risk taking studies in adolescents have either investigated risk alone with explicit 
risky decision tasks, such as the Game of Dice task, or the Columbia Card Task (e.g. Donati, 
Panno, Chiesi, & Primi, 2014; Figner et al., 2009a; Schiebener, Zamarian, Delazer, & Brand, 
2011; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015; van Leijenhorst et al., 2008), or have used paradigms in 
which risk and ambiguity were inseparable using paradigms such as the Iowa Gambling Task 
or the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (e.g., Crone, & van der Molen, 2004; Lejuez, Aklin, 
Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2010; 2012). Adult studies have also 
examined decisions under conditions of risk and ambiguity separately (see Gilboa & 
Schmeidler, 1989; Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, & Platt, 2006; Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, 
Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010; Tymula et al., 
2013). Risk-and ambiguity attitudes are typically unrelated, suggesting they are distinct 
elements of risk taking (Huettel et al., 2006; Levy et al., 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Given that risk-taking situations in daily-life typically include more ambiguous 
prospects―and adolescents are also more likely to make decisions detrimental to their health, 
well-being, and financial situation―it is of interest to study how ambiguity influences 
adolescents’ risk-taking. That is, ambiguous risk situations may provide a potential context in 
which adolescents are particularly likely to take more risks than adults (Defoe et al., 2015). 
One way to study risk- and ambiguity-attitudes is to include both risky gambles 
(known probabilities) and ambiguous gambles in a choice task. For instance, the study of Li 
and colleagues (Li, Brannon, & Huettel, 2014) included a two-choice task that presented a 
choice between a risky gamble with a 50-50 probability and an ambiguous gamble with 
unknown probabilities. A rational (i.e., ambiguity- and risk-neutral) decision maker should 
treat these gambles similarly and therefore choose both options equally often. When 
comparing children (8-9 years) with adults (19-27 years), children were indeed equally likely 
to choose the ambiguous and the risky option, whereas adults chose the risky option more 
often than the ambiguous option (see Figure 1). On a separate task, children were willing to 
pay as much to play out an ambiguous than a risky gamble, whereas adults were willing to 
pay more to play out the risky than the ambiguous gamble. Both findings highlight that 
children, in contrast to adults, did not yet differentially respond to risk versus ambiguity (Li et 
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al., 2014). This suggests that only in adolescence, ambiguity-aversion might start to develop 
into the pattern typically observed in adulthood. 
Adolescents’ risk- and ambiguity-aversion has been studied recently using a two-
choice paradigm with varying conditions of risk and ambiguity to estimate risk- and 
ambiguity-attitude across the life span from ages 12 to 90 (Tymula et al., 2013). Participants 
were recruited from four different age groups: adolescence (12-17 years), young adulthood 
(21-25 years), midlife adulthood (30-50 years), and older adulthood (65-90 years). One choice 
option was a consistent sure gain, whereas the other option was a lottery, that varied 
systematically in the amount that could be won, and either the probability of winning (in the 
case of a risky trial), or the level of ambiguity (in the case of an ambiguous trial) (Tymula et 
al., 2012; 2013). The level of ambiguity was varied by changing the size of an occluder that 
could cover more or less of the probabilities.  
This study observed pronounced differences across age groups in risk- and ambiguity-
attitude. That is, all age groups were risk-averse, with the older adults being most risk-averse 
(Tymula et al., 2013), and surprisingly adolescents being more risk-averse than adults 
(Tymula et al., 2012). Moreover, young adults, mid-life adults, and older adults were all 
similarly ambiguity-averse, suggesting that from adulthood, people remain relatively stable in 
their attitude towards ambiguity. However, when comparing ambiguity-attitude between 
adolescents (12-17 years) and adults (30-50 years) it was observed that adolescents were less 
ambiguity-averse than the adults (Figure 1). The authors interpreted this as a unique tolerance 
to ambiguity in adolescence. Note that in this study, risk- and ambiguity-attitude were 
uncorrelated in the adolescents, suggesting that risk and ambiguity indeed reflect different 
elements of adolescent risk-taking. This was further demonstrated by the finding that 
ambiguity-attitude, but not risk-attitude, was related to the frequency of self-reported reckless 
behavior in daily life. Specifically, less ambiguity-aversion was related to more frequent 
reckless behavior such as drinking and driving, and having unprotected sex. These findings 
suggest that tolerance to ambiguity may particularly change across adolescence, and could 
drive changes in real-life risk taking.  
Finally, to further test the age-related change in risk- and ambiguity-attitude across 
adolescence, Blankenstein and colleagues (2016) studied these attitudes in a larger adolescent 
sample (N=157) with a continuous age range between ages 10 and 25. Although individual 
differences were prominent, most participants were risk-averse, and risk-aversion did not 
change with age. Most participants were also ambiguity-averse, but contrary to risk-aversion, 
ambiguity-aversion increased linearly across adolescence (Figure 1). Furthermore, 
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Blankenstein et al. replicated the relation between ambiguity-attitude and the frequency of 
real-life reckless behavior, in which a greater ambiguity, but not risk-tolerance, was related to 
more reckless daily-life behavior. 
Taken together, these studies highlight that risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity 
(uncertainty about probabilities) are distinct elements of risk taking, which show different 
developmental patterns. Particularly, ambiguity-aversion seems to only emerge from age 10, 
increase across adolescence, and relate to real-life risk taking. Suggestively, a long-lasting 
tolerance to ambiguity in adolescence may be adaptive, given that adolescence is a period of 
increased novelty seeking which requires a certain tolerance to uncertain outcomes (e.g. 
Crone, & Dahl, 2012). A tolerance to uncertainty may thus be a mechanism that allows for 
accomplishing these goals, exploring new environments, and gathering information about the 
world (e.g., Hartley, & Somerville, 2015). A next step would be to relate tolerance to 
ambiguity not only to maladaptive risk taking in adolescence, but also to the more adaptive 
properties of risk taking behavior such as adolescents’ novelty-seeking and exploration-
tendencies. 
The what of adolescent risk-taking 
Until now, we have only described a small proportion of possible moderators in adolescent 
risk-taking (e.g., domain-specificity, risk and expected benefit perception, and risk- and 
ambiguity-attitude). Obviously adolescent risk-taking is a multifaceted phenomenon with a 
large array of underlying causes and drivers (for thorough overviews, see e.g., Boyer, 2006; 
Reyna & Farley, 2006). Nevertheless, we believe there is much potential by making more use 
of the tools and insights that the decision sciences (and related disciplines such as behavioral 
economics, decision neuroscience, neuroeconomics, and reinforcement-learning theory) 
provide to study adolescent risk-taking. In particular, we think that a better mechanistic 
understanding of psychological and neural processes can be gained by both taking advantage 
of the methodological tools and—at the theory level—by increasing specificity of our 
theoretical frameworks (e.g., Pfeifer, & Allen, 2016; van den Bos, & Eppinger, 2016). Thus, 
we propose that adopting methods and modeling approaches to decompose overt risk taking 
levels promises to advance our insights of adolescent risk-taking at a mechanistic level. Such 
a mechanistic understanding in turn promises to lead to more efficient prevention, 
intervention, and perhaps even treatment approaches in the future. 
In this section of our chapter, we will focus mostly on a selection of formal risky 
choice models and how they may help to improve our understanding of the mechanisms and 
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drivers underlying adolescent risk-taking. As we (e.g., Figner, & Weber, 2011; van 
Duijvenvoorde, & Crone, 2013) and others have pointed out before, adopting a formal 
modeling approach is one promising avenue to advance the field. Within risky decision 
making research, different types of formal models exist. In the next section, we focus on main 
models that have been predominantly applied to adults’ risk-taking. We first describe these 
main model types, and subsequently their potential applicability for understanding adolescent 
risk-taking. 
Expectation models 
A prominent class of models can be referred to as expectation models (e.g., Pachur, Hertwig, 
Gigerenzer, & Brandstätter, 2013): Individuals are assumed to compute some kind of 
subjective value of the available choice options by multiplicatively integrating information on 
outcome magnitudes and outcome probabilities. In a next step, the option with the highest 
subjective value is then chosen (more details, including a historical overview, can be found 
for example in Weber & Johnson, 2008).  
The earliest of such models were expected value models, i.e., the sum of each 
objective outcome magnitude multiplied with its objective outcome probability. In a next step, 
an important refinement was then to assume that the subjective representation of outcome 
magnitudes can differ from the objective outcome magnitude, and that the subjective value 
("expected utility," thus Expected Utility Theory, EUT) can be modeled with marginally 
decreasing sensitivity (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954), e.g., by a power 
function with an exponent smaller than 1. EUT can explain why most people are typically risk 
averse. For example, given a choice between EUR 45 for sure versus a 50% chance to win 
EUR 100 and otherwise EUR 0, most individuals would choose the riskless EUR 45 for sure, 
although the objective expected value of the risky option is higher (e.g., the objective EV = 
.50 * 100 = 50). This behavior would indicate that the value function is not linear, but 
modified with an exponent (e.g., 0.5 * 1000.88 = 0.5 * 57.54 = 28.77), creating a concave value 
function indicating risk aversion. Note that the work by Tymula and colleagues (2012; 2013) 
and Blankenstein and colleagues (2016) that we discussed earlier in this chapter, addresses a 
modelling approach using a type of EUT framework. These studies demonstrate the 
usefulness of combining developmental work with formal models of risky choice in 
disentangling influences of risk and ambiguity.   
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Another prominent example of a further refined subjective expected utility model is 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's Prospect Theory (PT) (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1979) 
and cumulative PT (Tversky, & Kahneman, 1992). In brief, PT models risky choice (as well 
as individual and situational differences therein) by a set of parameters that translate objective 
attributes (probabilities, gain amounts, loss amounts) into subjective representations, allowing 
for deviations of subjective representations from their objective counterparts. In typical PT 
specifications, this is represented by a so-called value function (e.g. a function that is assumed 
to be typically steeper for losses than gains, reflecting what is often referred to as loss-
aversion, i.e, that losses loom larger than gains), and a probability weighting function which 
defines the deviation from objective probabilities (i.e., people typically overweight small 
probabilities and underweight large probabilities). An example of the use of PT in adolescent 
decision making is a recent study testing to what extent advice from an adult expert influences 
risky decision making in early adolescents (ages 12-14), late adolescents (ages 15-17), and 
adults (ages 18-45) (Engelmann, Moore, Capra, & Berns, 2012). While undergoing functional 
MRI participants made decisions with real financial outcomes between sure wins and risky 
lotteries. On half the trials, risk-averse advice from a financial expert was displayed, which 
participants were free to ignore. On the other half of the trials, participants made choices 
without advice. Results indicated significantly more adult-like behavior in both adolescent 
groups in the presence of advice. By using cumulative prospect theory, the authors observed 
that advice particularly influenced the weighting of probabilities in adolescence. In addition 
advice increased the correlation strength between activity in the lateral PFC and behavioral 
valuation of safe choices in adolescents. In contrast, in adults advice decreased the correlation 
strength between activity in ventral medial PFC (vmPFC) and risky choice valuation. Thus, 
social advice may modulate adolescents’ behavior via valuation-specific enhancement of 
cognitive-control processes (as reflected by lateral PFC activation).  
Related but simpler approaches to decomposition in an expectation-model framework 
investigate the impact of the objective properties of risky choices on risk-taking levels. In our 
own work, we developed the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner & Voelki, 2004; Figner, 
Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009a; 2009b) for exactly this purpose, namely to be able to 
assess not only overt risk-taking levels in different age groups, but to investigate the impact of 
variations in “economic primitives” of risky choice, namely the potential gains, potential 
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losses, and their probabilities (e.g., Figner et al., 2009a; Panno, Lauriola, & Figner, 2013)1. 
With the CCT we have observed that adolescents from age 14 on adequately adjusted their 
risk taking towards changing levels of gains, losses, and probabilities, but particularly so in a 
‘cold’ (more deliberative) choice situation compared to a ‘hot’ (affectively-driven) choice 
situation. 
These recent studies illustrate that the use of such models may allow us to move from 
describing whether there are changes in risky choice across development, to what choice 
processes drive these observed changes. That is, these decomposition approaches—ranging 
from the relatively simple models investigating objective properties to the more sophisticated 
models that account for subjective representations—thus allow to not only test when 
adolescent risk-taking is more likely to occur (such as when comparing ‘hot’ versus ‘cold’ 
decision-making), but also what is changing (such as reduced control, or reduced information 
processing, or changes in sensitivity to gains, losses, probabilities, etc.) and how that might 
explain changes in adolescents risk-taking levels.  
Risk-Return Models 
There is a variety of other formal risky choice models besides expectation models. Of those, 
the most similar to the expectation models are the so-called risk-return models (e.g., Weber, 
2010) (this model type is also the basis of the DOSPERT scale discussed earlier). The risk-
return framework decomposes risky choices into a return and a risk component. The return 
component can be modeled by the expected value of the risky choice option (i.e., an 
integration of probability and outcome magnitudes), and the risk component by its outcome 
variability (often operationalized via the variance or the standard deviation of the outcome 
distribution). Thus, in contrast to the expectation models, risk-return models contain an 
explicit component of risk, making them attractive from a psychological perspective. The 
main idea is that, when making a risky choice, decision-makers trade-off possible returns 
against possible risks: Most individuals like increasing returns and thus increasing returns are 
associated with approach (i.e., an increasing likelihood to choose the risky option). On the 
other hand, most individuals dislike increasing risks, and therefore increasing risks are often 
associated with avoidance (i.e., a decreasing likelihood to choose the risky option).  
                                                             
1  Nevertheless, to adopt a more advanced decomposition approach, we recently have 




As we discussed in more detail in Figner and Weber (2011) and van Duijvenvoorde et 
al. (2015), this decomposition allows for a metric of individuals' sensitivity to returns, their 
sensitivity to risks, and the tradeoffs between the risks and returns. In our own work, we 
developed an fMRI-CCT version to investigate risk-return tradeoffs in children, adolescents, 
and adults while they make dynamic risky choices in the MRI scanner (van Duijvenvoorde et 
al., 2015). While we did not observe any age-related differences in overt risk-taking levels, 
we observed pronounced individual and age-related differences in behavioral and neural 
sensitivities to returns and risks. That is, neural activation in response to expected value 
increased monotonically with age in a valuation network including the vmPFC and posterior 
cingulate cortex (see Figure 2). Neural activation in response to risk, on the other hand, 
peaked in adolescents, as reflected in increased activation in the insula and dorsal medial 
prefrontal cortex. Moreover, we observed that adolescents’ behaviorally estimated risk- and 
return-sensitivity was related to these neural activations (Figure 2). 
Risk-return decompositions have been used successfully in adults, but only rarely in 
developmental work (e.g. Burnett et al., 2010; Paulsen et al., 2011; 2012). To the best of our 
knowledge, all of these developmental studies (including our own) investigated only the 
effects of objective risk. That is, these analyses assume (at least implicitly) that subjective risk 
does not differ systematically from objective risk. For future work, it might be fruitful to 
investigate whether subjective and objective risk might differ in systematic ways, and perhaps 
so differently across different age groups.  
Piagetian and heuristic models 
Besides expectation and risk-return models, the decision sciences, behavioral economics, and 
other disciplines developed other decision-making models relevant for risk taking. For 
example, there are a wide range of lexicographic and other heuristic models that do not 
assume that decision-makers always take into account all the relevant information about 
outcome magnitudes and outcome probabilities. In developmental psychology, these models 
have been fruitfully combined with thinking and methodology in Jean Piaget's and Robert 
Siegler's tradition (e.g., Jansen, van Duijvenvoorde, & Huizenga, 2011). This work is based 
on the assumption that younger children might first not take into account all relevant pieces of 
information, but only focus on some of it, like for example loss magnitude (though see 
Wilkening, & Anderson, 1982). That is, a Piagetian framework states that children’s problem 
solving is a progression through a series of suboptimal stages before the "correct" or 
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"normative" strategy is used. This resembles the use of decision heuristics, or strategies that 
simplify the decision process by comparing options based on a limited set of attributes. The 
use of verbatim (e.g., normative and mathematical reasoning) and gist-based (e.g., intuitive 
and heuristic) strategies across development has also been prominently outlined in fuzzy-trace 
theory (Reyna, & Rivers, 2008). This theory, however, states that children rely more on 
verbatim processes, whereas across development we would increasingly rely on gist. This 
increased use of gist predicts a greater susceptibility to biases in decision-making across 
development, yet similarly an increase in risk-averse behavior (see for a detailed description 
Reyna & Farley, 2006; Reyna, & Rivers, 2008). A study by Jansen and colleagues (Jansen, 
van Duijvenvoorde, & Huizenga, 2011) supports both accounts by observing that a more 
normative decision strategy (combining outcomes and probability into expected value) was 
increasingly adopted with age, although the use of more complex heuristics also increased. 
Yet predominantly large individual differences were observed in decision strategy between 
children of the same age group. 
Recent neuroimaging findings further tested such individual differences and observed 
that adults may differ in their tendency to engage in different (non)-heuristic decision 
strategies, which was reflected in distinct underlying neural signals during choice (van 
Duijvenvoorde, Figner, Weeda, van der Molen, & Huizenga, 2016; Venkatraman, & Huettel, 
2012). Additionally, a recent study observed that adolescents who used a more complicated 
reasoning strategy showed greater activation in cognitive-control regions such as the PFC and 
parietal cortex, over and above age (Peters, Koolschijn, Crone, van Duijvenvoorde, & 
Raijmakers, 2014). The acknowledgement of different decision strategies within, and 
between, age groups is particularly important for illustrating the level of individual 
differences across distinct developmental phases.  
 
Reinforcement learning 
Another class of modeling frameworks have their origins in reinforcement-learning theory 
and often focus more on the involved dynamics over time, for example how individuals in 
different age groups might differentially learn from probabilistic positive and negative 
feedback, and how that can affect their decisions and decision strategies (Hämmerer & 
Eppinger, 2012). A more detailed and formal analysis of sensitivity to positive feedback (i.e., 
gains) and negative feedback (i.e., losses) can be made by examining outcomes in relation to 
prior expectations. When decision outcomes do not match expectations formed on the basis of 
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previous trials, they trigger a learning signal that is referred to as a prediction error. A 
prediction error signals a mismatch between expected and obtained outcomes, and is therefore 
positive if outcomes are better than expected and negative if outcomes are worse than 
expected. Adolescents may show heightened prediction error signals to both positive (Cohen 
et al., 2010) and negative outcomes (Hauser, Iannaccone, Walitza, Brandeis, & Brem, 2015), 
although these developmental differences in prediction-error coding are not consistently 
observed (van den Bos, Cohen, Kahnt, & Crone, 2012).  
The extent to which a prediction error alters subsequent subjective valuation of choice 
options depends on one’s estimated learning rate. High learning rates give heavy weighting to 
recent outcomes, whereas lower learning rates lead to more integration over a longer feedback 
history. It has been observed that children weight recent negative feedback more heavily (van 
den Bos et al., 2012), and are more responsive to occasional losses. That is, in a probabilistic 
learning task, children and young adolescents have been found to continue updating behavior 
after receiving an occasional loss, which―in a stable choice environment―results in lower 
overall outcomes (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2012). On the other hand, learning rates for gains 
may increase across adolescence (van der Schaaf, Warmerdam, Crone, & Cools, 2011). These 
opposite developmental patterns could lead to variable weighting of positive and negative 
outcomes in adolescents’ behavior (Hartley, & Somerville, 2015). Future studies should 
examine in which ways such learning signals might differ as a function of task context and 
how these factors might contribute to adolescent risk-taking. 
Summary of model-based approaches 
To summarize, in this chapter we tried to show that the adoption of formal modeling 
approaches that allow decomposition of overt risk-taking levels into underlying processes is a 
still underused tool in developmental studies. These promising approaches have shown to not 
only lead to novel and highly relevant insights, but to also substantially advance the 
developmental (neuroscience) field as it moves to more concrete and specific models. For 
instance, if we observe an adolescent’s reckless behavior, is this driven by a heightened 
tolerance to ambiguity, a lower sensitivity to risk, or a heightened focus on possible benefits? 
The question of what model to use is partly an empirical question. That is, explicit model fits 
allow a researcher to compare (nested) sets of models in order to test which model best 
describes the data. On the other hand, if the specific research interest and the methodological 
paradigm is focused towards a particular aspect (such as the learning or processing of 
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outcomes), this will of course also determine what type or class of model is the most 
appropriate. 
However, we also want to point out that when such a formal modeling approach is 
adopted, it is important to critically evaluate the used model. Adult research has shown that 
there is both substantial inter-individual and intra-individual variation in risky choice 
strategies. On the one hand, different individuals may habitually tend to differ in how they 
make risky decisions (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2016). On the other hand, decision-makers 
can also adaptively adjust their strategies as a function of context and the task at hand (e.g., 
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). This means that the same formal model might be able to 
explain one participant's risky decisions very well while it fails to capture and model the 
relevant processes of another decision maker. In developmental studies, this problem might be 
aggravated given that children and adolescents go to multiple phases of transitions, resulting 
in age-related systematic differences. So, if for example a study uses prospect theory as a 
model framework, one should not only estimate the relevant parameters and compare them 
across age groups, but should also test whether prospect theory is equally able to explain the 
choices of all age groups equally well. This additional investigational step is not only 
important to safeguard interpretations but is likely to contribute by itself to a better 
understanding of how and why different age groups may differ in their risky choices. 
Conclusion and Future Directions 
In this chapter, we have discussed the “when” and “what” of adolescent risk-taking, by 
considering contextual moderators of adolescent risk-taking and by considering several 
formal model approaches that may be used to advance our knowledge of what drives and 
underlies adolescent risk-taking. Specifically, we addressed the importance of testing the 
domain-specificity of adolescent risk-taking, the type of uncertainty of the decision-context, 
and described how these factors may drive adolescents’ daily-life risky choice. Besides purely 
describing levels of risk taking by different individuals in different situations (e.g., Figner & 
Weber, 2011), an important goal of studying adolescent risky choice is to understand what 
drives risk taking, especially when the ultimate goal is to help adolescents make better 
decisions, or to understand the adaptive nature of risk taking behaviors. For these goals, a 
model-based approach is an interesting starting point to decompose the processes that 
contribute to adolescent risk-taking. Here, we have laid out a set of models that could be 
applied to adolescent behavior.  
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  Finally, we want to highlight two research topics in adolescent risk-taking for which 
the approaches in this chapter may be particularly useful (and are increasingly being utilized). 
First, changes across adolescence in overt or decomposed risk taking may be influenced by 
levels of pubertal hormones (Blakemore et al., 2010; Crone, & Dahl, 2012). Studies that aim 
to disentangle age- and puberty-related changes provide important information which 
developmental process (age or hormones) steers neural and behavioral changes in adolescent 
risk-taking (Braams et al., 2015; Peper & Dahl, 2013; de Water et al., 2013), and can be easily 
combined with a model-based perspective. Second, a vast number of studies have tested how 
social context influences adolescent risk-taking, including manipulations of peer presence, 
peer advice, or peer pressure (Somerville 2013; Albert, Chein, & Steinberg, 2013). Note that 
most risk-taking paradigms in this chapter are well-suited for creating a social decision-
context that can be combined with social-valuation and social-learning models (see Ruff & 
Fehr, 2014, for an overview). 
Advancing our understanding of developmental changes in risky decision-making is 
important for providing crucial input such as to optimize adolescents’ decisions or providing 
interventions for problematic choice behaviors when necessary. Although adolescence is often 
described as a period of heightened risk taking, the flexible nature of adolescence can also 
have several advantages for rapid learning and adjustment to changing context. A better 
conceptualization of adolescents’ sensitivities will be an important step toward understanding 
adolescent advantages in decision-making, as well as specific behaviors with negative 
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Figure 1: A three-panel figure of developmental results on ambiguity-aversion. Left panel 
displays adults, in contrast to children, prefer a risky compared to an ambiguous prospect 
(adopted from Li et al., 2014; Frontiers in Psychology). Middle panel displays larger 
ambiguity aversion in adults (adopted from Tymula et al., 2012; PNAS); Right panel displays 







Figure 2: Adopted from van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015, Journal of Neuroscience: Age-
related changes in neural activation in response to return (upper panel) and risk (lower panel). 
Upper panel: Return activation increases across childhood, adolescence, and adulthood in the 
ventral medial PFC and posterior cingulate cortex. Greater neural activation is associated with 
greater behavioral sensitivity (approach) to return. Lower panel: Risk activation peaks in 
adolescence in the dorsal medial PFC and the insula. Greater neural activation to risks is 
associated with greater behavioral sensitivity (aversion) to risk, but only for adolescents. 
 
 
